Do or Pretend? Thoughts about the Defence Economic Relations of the European Security and Defence Policy

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Abstract
This paper shows the historical environment, the results and the problems of the defense aspect of the european integration. The author points out, that the defense integration is difficult not only on the field of capabilities, but on the area of armament and researches too. The study aims to draw attention to the fact, that the further strengthening of the european integration and the future of European Union are significantly based on the question of defense integration.

Keywords: defense integration, European Union, armament industry, European Defense Agency

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1. INTRODUCTION

The fact that the weakest and most critical point, defense- and security politics of the European integration is essential for world power cues, furthermore the development of joint defense- and security is a long known matter. However it is worth to reflect on this matter from an unusual aspect, namely how do the issues of the more advanced economical integration appear on the horizon of defense- and security politics. If this sector means a serious challenge in the foregoer

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1 Next to the political references it would be reasonable to analyze the aquisitional, armaments industrial and logistical reality in another study. About the changes of this and it 21st century questions see: VARGA, LÁSZLÓ – TURCSÁNYI, KÁROYLI: A brit védelmi
economical integration, then consequences can be drawn about the political integration, broader in point of the EU's defense matters and it's whole future.

This domain induces actual and critical questions for years, that is amplified by every characteristic of the postjaltan internation environment, together with the economical world-wide crisis and the effects and processes generated by it, which is their own duality point at the invigoration of the state's role once again, as much as they create an opportunity to the political integration's recruitment.

2. THE PANORAMA OF TWO AND A HALF DECADES: POSTJALTAN ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD CRISIS

„Nowadays to say that we live in a transition between an old, dying and a new, unborn world order counts as a cliche” still this is the reality. The previous world order, in other words the so called jaltan world order ended, as most of its essential criteras disappeared. This of course has different effect in regard to geopolitical and world power matters and has different effects on economical and research segments. However the differences are important between these diverse effects and domains, sithence after the end of the jaltan order the world economy, as a world order without the barrier of bipolar superpowers – but with still present partially nation-state limits – could become whole and create a very complex global network. To revise the events of the last period from the viewpoint of the study's subject, it is imperative to look at the changes on the world order's level which acted significantly in point of the economical order too.

„The jaltan setting was unparalled in history. This world order wasn't created by a single empire's hegemony or generated by states of broadly equal in power size multi-actor balance sport, instead it was established by the agreement of two nations that were militarily far more powerful than the others. Their direct impact, or rather influence expanded to the whole world not only figuratively but literally.” Therefore what ended is a global order that was based on the military, troubled on the surface but based on an unspoken agreement, built on an arms race


3 GALLÓ, BÉLA: A túlélés tudománya [The science of surviving], 2000, Helikon kiadó, Budapest, 7.
and antagonistical opposition, which expanded to the whole world, notably to
given spheres of interest that gave mandate to act on their border. In my opinion
this international power structure, in other word this world order was the first truly
global world order in the history of humanity, which could own the real
completeness of globality.\(^4\) Consequently this world order was historically unique,
and it is a fact that it ended, it is not clarified until this day that what kind of order
comes after the transition or interregnum it left behind. It is questionable too that
the forming new system will be able to own the characteristics essential to the
wholeness of global world order similar to the jaltan.

The issue of the jaltan heritage may work out any way soever, it is sure that
„a new, world order is forming that is very different from the jaltan. And if we
don't close our eyes before the North Atlantic events […] we have to discover that
on global levels the North-South […] conflict becomes more and more
determinative. […] But it is at least this evident the fact that with the disappearance
of the great enemy […] the weak point of the victors became increasingly
obvious.”\(^5\)

It is a sad historical fact that the world haven't become more peaceful,
predictable and more conflict-free with the break-up of the eastern block. The
similarly important realization follows from it, that fundamental transformations
take place in the circumstances that supporting the approaches until now,
accordingly it is partially really true, „that it is typical to this new era that the power
spreads over from the states to new actors”\(^6\) In point of the changes it has proven
true that there is not reason to exaggerations and euphoria. It is true the same way
to the democracy's and liberal-capitalism's triumph as in point of the non-statal
actors. The topic of this study levels to that domain in which the state's importance
is still exclusive, and the so called revolutionary or at least historical postjaltan
changes appear to be relative and partial.

It is proven true until today that several states' cooperative action is needed to
hold the global peace and security on a relative level, as the fact too that the
rivalism between the world powers is still exists, in which the United States of
America is hegemon but not peak hegemon, since the thesis according to which
the „USA transformed only in a century (…) into a power that can enforce its will
anywhere on the world and its influence reaches anywhere in the world, first in the
history.”\(^7\)

\(^4\) The previous „world orders” were only orders of continents, or world orders without the
technical, economical and militry completeness, which existed only in the foregorund of
the decisive hegemon sample in longer-shorther historical periods. I consider like this the
age of Roman Empire, the perios of German-Roman Empire's strengh, and the Dutch- and
then the English navaly hegemony.
\(^6\) ZAKARIA, FAREED: A postamerikai világ [The postameican world], 2009, Gondolat
kiadó, Budapest, 33.
\(^7\) BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW: A nagy sakktábla [The great chesstable], 1999, Európa kiadó,
Budapest, 9.
With Zakaria Fareed's ideas placed in a somewhat different environment, we could say that the world called postamerican by him is „not about the fall of America, but about the rise of the others”, as Russia looks to be rising again, China may have began an unstoppable upswing, and next to all these, because of the EU's economical invigoration, the first steps were on the way to the power-political independence. If next to these peak actors we draw up the South American integration efforts or India's rising weight, then it is distinct that we live in a difficultly forecastable, and diffuse relation rich transient period. This multi-stakeholder aspect was made more complex and fearsome by the events of 11 september and the terrorist attacks followed by it, furthermore by the different modern security threats. As primarily we can say because of the international terrorism's attacks and their aftermath in Afghanistan and Iraq that „...the United States of America is in difficult situation, its myth of invulnerability shattered and its government undertook impractical tasks alone”

The undertaking of impractical taks brought a wide range of crises with itself. On the one part „Washington's intervention in Iraq caused a crisis in the North Atlantic Treaty. Germany and France disapproved of the one-sided american move.” On the other part the war against terrorism and its security action made a serious chip on the constitutionality's requirements of predominancy. Thirdly this challenge pointed out again the importance of states' defense nature and the weight of the defense sector. Furthermore this kind of „crusade” somewhat divided the attention and on the level of common frame of mind the realisation of the economical world crisis became much more sudden too, which opened the way to the strenghtening of another field of statal intervention.

Accordingly the last ten years brough serious and remarkable changes on the field of the world politics and then to the world economy too, what together means a great challenge and numerous oppurtunities in the same time for the european integration. The sum of oppurtunities reside in that, the legal and political integration shows a resolution for the tasks that burden – in some cases exceed – the nationstates in themselves. Several effective precedents appear for this in

8 ZAKARIA: op. cit. 31.
9 DEÁK, PÉTER: Biztonságpolitika a hétköznapokban [Securitypolicies in the weekdays], 2009, Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest, 38.
11 Several analist of the European Union explained this:, see: „...the financial crysis is a risk and an opportunity in the same time for the European defense sector. On the one hand it looks reasonable the the decreasing budgets increase the cooperation pressure for the member-states, and this way they solve the EU's problems regarding the defense industry and the trade development and structural conversion. On the other hand in spite of decade long speeches and initiations for more cooperation and less national interest, to the European Union's defense issues the national privilege is characteristical.” – Direcorate General for External Policies, Policy Department: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Europen Defence, 2011, SEDE, 14.
respect to research and economy. In the research field great steps were made towards the unification of the intellectual property's law. "The law of intellectual property is one of the most widely, even internationally harmonized law area, this harmonization looks back to more than a hundred years history " and the experience it generated was used to ensure the harmonization on the Union's level for the research and development. More intensive and dynamic changes can be revealed among the political integration's economically determined changes in regard to the money-markets' union control, as the world economical crisis generated by the credit crunch acted with such force on this filed, that opened the way for efficient changes for the union level.

However next to the opportunities numerous challenges line up, these reside in that, it has to form actual abilities, next to the existing or the planned ones in numerous areas for the political aims and institutional frames to deepen the political integration. This is especially true in point of defense, it follows from this, that to the armaments industry and defense research and development too. The defense sector appears to be quite difficult area in this aspect, what on one hand can be justified by it's special political relations, on the other hand by it's special status in economy's order.

In its essence the extant – and the altering – power structure appears to be difficultly understandable, or at least hardly analysable and forecastable, as it were: "The international world of the early XXI. century, the increasing number of actors, the world disarrangement and world disorder offers even complex orientation alternatives than ever before."

Compared to this the economical environment is prima facie more easily understandable insomuch that the world economy as world order with the decomposition of the bipolar could expand and become global without changing the political field and without political barriers. As Wallerstein said: "The modern world order is world economical order – as much today as always in its history.

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14 Galló, Béla: Az újkapitalizmus régi világa [The old world of newcapitalism], 2010, Napvilág kiadó, Budapest, 14.
15 "In the last part of the 20th century the unity of worldcapitalism was restored and the capitalis became a whole systeam again." Símai, Mihály: A világgazdaság a XXI. század forgatagában [The worldeconomy in the vortex of 21st century], 2008, Akadémiai kiadó, Budapest, 26.
One of the determinative attribute of the world economical orders is that, they are not bracketed by some kind of unified political structure. Instead of this, numerous political orders exist next to each other in the world economical order, which are connected by the net of loose interstate connections in our modern world structure.\textsuperscript{16}

The global economical relations are moved by the clear economical interests in the centrum-halfperiphery-periphery relations system, and like this the economical connections and the research and development can cover the whole world like a network. This image is absolutely true only on the first approach, as the armaments industry and the defense research and development is that is attached to the states primarily and decisively builds on given states' order and claim, or at least well capturable national sphere of interest.\textsuperscript{17}

Naturally the economical crisis affected the defense sector daintly too, as it amplified the states' existing tendencies, which bring forth the reduction of defense budget at any time. From Europe's point of view this is a double-edged phenomenon, as few of the EU states can be viewed as militarily weighty and the extant situation has additional negative effects on the not certainly satisfactory abilities, meanwhile the EU couldn't relieve the states even on a short term, even if they devoted themselves to this level of political integration to the pressure of the crisis. The most notable effect of the crisis' pressure would be the actual decision and the beginning of slow construction. The national fixity of the armaments industry appears much harder in respect to the EU, as the more developed states concerned by this market have a strong interest in keeping and strengthening their own armaments industry. Considering this market the EU has to do some basic unionisation steps, except the investment politics needed for occurrent unification. I could word the latter after all, that in pont of the armaments indunstry and this market's research and developent the EU should act qu. as a state. In respect ot the armaments industry it looks like the usual integration routine with institution-building, and waiting for the right political moment. It is needed on this field to enchance the political integration, to build up the truly effective institutional background and to gently form the economical backgrount and the investment palette to reach slow but real successes, which could establish the developement of real union defence capabilities on the field of armaments industry.

3. EU EFFORTS IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR

,,On 17 May 2004 the European Union's Council approved the 2010 Headline

\textsuperscript{16}\textsc{Wallerstein, Immanuel: Bevezetés a világrendszer-elméletbe} [Introduction to World-system analysis], 2010, L’Harmattan, Budapest, 57.
\textsuperscript{17} To clarify, the main orderer of the american defense industrial companies is the United States of America, so they set their action and development profile for the inerests of the USA, because next to the orders of the States they count on the most immmmediate allies and significant national dotation.
Goal, which reflects the objectives of the European Security Strategy and highlitedly emphasizes the qualitative improvement of capabilities and the quick reaction ability.\textsuperscript{18} On 12 of July in the same year, the Council decided next to a joint action to create the European Defence Agency\textsuperscript{19}, then at the end of November they decided about the creation of EU combat teams and finally as the ending of the year 2004, the EU's military mission stared in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) as the continuation of SFOR activity\textsuperscript{20}

Sadly we have to say that after 2004 the Union had to face serious dilemmas – on this field too –, and the idea of division between the more and less developed areas emerged along with the thesis of the defence integration's core principled fortification. To the latter the European Security and Denfece Union's Belgian, French, Luxembourgish and German conception was the example, which prevised an increased defence integration, in which not all EU states would be necessarily partner. On the one hand this clustering would have redefined the Petersberg tasks\textsuperscript{21} and the requirements and roles connected with its assumption, on the other hand it would have acutely increase the defence character as if it were a „hard core” inside the EU. This two-speed plan, that can be related to the European conception, was only one of the clouded ideas after 2004.

However, after 2004 the European Security and Defence institution extended almost constantly both in agency and in qualification (see the European Security and Defence Academy), in some measure by the fulfilment of the constitutional procedure's partial results, and underkaen missions were ongoing too, the Joint Security and Defence Policy (henceforth: JSDP) got in the shadows of the hardnesses of mass enlargement, but even more in the shadows of the international events. It is true that the Italian presidency accepted the European Security Strategy, which can be interpreted as additional big landmark, as well as serious decisions were made against organized crime and terrorism, and the protection of the borders, still the Iraqi war and with it the depraved transatlantic were what became decisive.

Certainly this overshadowed state, that was replaced by the economical crisis.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} These arrangement were expanded by the Petersberg declaration in 1992, which stated by law the frames of the european defense and security organisation, and it adverted these functions to the WEU's sphere of action: (1) peacekeeping, (2) humanitarian actions, (3) rescue actions, (4) crysis-mangement, (5) security roles regarding conflict prevention. The Petersberg head stated that the WEU is authorized to partially requisite the NATO forces disposed by the member-states, and the development of required military abilities has to be started immediately, the creatio and realization of „the forces offered to cooperation with’ program', in which the member-states can command forces to particular tasks, and missions. See BABOS, TIBOR: Az európai biztonság öt központi pillére [The five central pillar of european security], 2007, Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest, 116-117.
in 2008 and lately by the answers given to it, does not mean the break of development. It can be valued as a positive sign that „the European Defence Agency was created by the joint action of the Council of Ministers with the purpose to (1) improve the defence capabilities, especially the crisis management of the EU; (2) move forward the armament collaboration of the Union; (3) establish the EU's defence industrial and technological foundations and to create a competitive European defence equipment market; (4) support the research to establish Europe's defence industrial and technological potential.”

Moreover it is important to state, that the JSDP which gives the independent pillar, the body of common foreign and internal politics, operated and bloomed on a missional level, as „in 2005 the EU took over the command of the stabilisation forces stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These were followed later by short term missions in Africa, Asia and in the Middle East. In the May of 2007 the EU started a police mission for 3 years in Afghanistan, and it stationed a military force with more than three thousand men in borderland of Chad and Middle-Africa at the beginning of 2008 to provide protection for the refugees who had to abandon their homeland because of the battles in the neighbouring Darfur region. The Union carried out a naval mission for the first time in 2008. The goal of the mission was to provide protection from the pirates for the ships delivering food aid to the country.” These and especially the naval missions were followed by others, and are followed by until today, for which the most essential organisational developments slowly come to fruition expanded by the effort to harmonize the European armaments industry products and the market.

Besides the always returning criticism is well known in point of the JSDP, that the political – organisational structure was given and readied before Lisboa, partial results pre-existed, but in military manner first the 2003 offering and then the setting of offering for 2010, was that did not live up to the expectations from the point of view of function and operability. The critics lay it down again and again, that the EU repeats its own failures again and again when it creates the institutional and organizational settings, but forgets to assign the tasks and executive capacity, or creates it faultly.

25 See GÁLIK, ZOLTÁN: A közös európai kül- és biztonságpolitika történelmi tapasztalatai és a Lisszaboni Szerződés [The historical experience of the european common foreing- and
In accordance with some observations in point of the suggested and real flaws – according to my standpoint it is relevant – the Lisbon Treaty could not make a breakthrough on the field of JSDP, although it is unquestionable, that it brought revolutionary changes in point of the Common Domestic and Foreign Policy (henceforth: CDFP) with the new organizational, agency and importance rating, and with the termination of the pillar system and CDFP’S integration into politics. On the whole I think that despite the successful reforms on the field of foreign policy, Lisbon made only technical changes in point of JSDP and made only declarative messages to the future.

After all we have to highlight the European Defense Agency as an accomplishment in the negative characterization, which is the most important among the agencies falling under the head of the JSDP. The main task of the agency created by the joint countenance on 12 July 2014 and which is seated in Brussels is to „support the endeavours of the states and the council made to improve the European defense capabilities and the decisions made on the field of crisis management, and the maintenance of the European security and defense policy’s current form and it’s development in the future.” The joint decision was changed to a regulation on 12 July 2011, thus indicated by the leaders of the EU the intention to support and consolidate the Agency. It was decisive in the creation of the agency that the members of the Union „conventionally spend less on defense expenses and research and development on the field of armaments industry. The high level of fragmentation makes the efficiency improvements of the European armaments industry much more difficult. The aim of the agency’s creation was to improve and synchronize the development of states’ defense capabilities, the promotion of military preparations, to keep an eye on the industrial and technological defense security policies and the Treaty of Lisbon], in Grotius, available at: http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/MVVYUP/73%20galik%20zoltan.pdf [cit. 2010-05-08].


market of Europe, as well as on the support of research and development of the armaments industry.” The agency becomes decisive with this, as it coordinates between armaments industry’s companies, as well as it does among the member-states who appear on the market as customers, and completes this with providing information for the member-states and performing advisory and expert tasks. This integrated approach contributes to the unified improvement of capabilities, where supply and demand will connect optimally to save time and expense. However beyond the cooperation the agency’s operation and approach gives a change to reshape the industrial structure and to form a continental armaments industrial market.

Since the establishment of the agency – thanks to the agency itself too – different regulational and declarative steps were made, which pointed toward the unification, although with the “overpondered advance” peculiar to political integration. From these we could firstly emphasize the Green Book of Public Purchase of National Defense fo 2004 based on „Towards a European Union Defence Equipment Policy“ titled Communication from the Commission of 2003, which points out that it wishes to contribute to the the gradual development of „European Defence Equipment Market“ (EDEM), which is the creation of a more transparent and relatively more open market between the member-states, which – with respecting the characteristics of the economical sector – would improve it’s economical effectiveness. The progress towards the Europe sized market has key role in the improvement of European economical sectors’ competitiveness, in providing better distribution of national defense connected funds and in the cause of supporting the Unions military capacity development, in the scope of the Joint Security and Defense Policy (JSDP).”

The Green Book pointed out in the same time the characteristics that lie in the armaments industry, and to the fact that the unification is essential to this market too, so much to the whole economical integration as in regard to the strengthening of the political integration’s real capability development. This effort – which was indicated by the GreenBook’s statements – was followed by actual decisions. from these „A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry“, that was accepted by the member-states, and the „The Code of Best

28 KENDE, TAMÁS – SZÜCS, TAMÁS (ed.): Bevezetés az Európai Unió Politikáiba [Introduction to policies of European Union], 2009., Osiris kiadó, Budapest, 764.
Practice in the Supply Chain" of 2006 has to be highlighted. These policies, that were accepted by the member-states, were pointing toward the union of the purchase side, of course these can’t be called breakthroughs because of the political bargain processes, particularly not if we take into account that these were followed by the specification of the „Treaty in the field of defence procurement” in 2006, which again pointed out the characteristics of the defense industry and reinforced the political obstacles that hindered the creation of the European defense market.

The exception specification was reasonlike, yet from the integration’s point of view it was still valued as step back, and its weight was felt by the Union’s decision makers too. Because of this in 2007 they released a strategical communication with the title of „A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry”, in which they schedule the conditions and tasks of the unification of the European defense industry. This strategy – which was created only in the form of a communication – did not complete – not even partially – until today. After this the defense market’s relations were mainly affected by the decisions in connection with the security strategy, like the decision concerning weapon commerce, which neither can be called particular successes.

So the passed time shows, as if the forming of unified European defence market stopped, and this establishes assumptions in connection with the creation of the unified European defense capabilities, namely with the political integration’s further strengthening. From the point of view of the integration these negative assumptions can not be neutralized by the mission activities, nor the institutional changes experienced on the field of foreign service, especially not because the numerers concerning the defense market show fragmentation rather than integration.

On the one hand we can tell, that the Union’s armaments industry is almost 90% concentrated in the six most powerful industrial member-states, namely in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. On the other hand however we can see that in the region there are more than 2000 companies and more than 80 000 suppliers are registered. Next to the more significant industrial states, it is typical to the smaller states that they give home for numerous armaments industrial companies. The fragmentation is well shown by that, from the worlds 20 leading armaments industrial companies there is only 5 european, while from the 100 biggest firms approximately 33. This question’s highlighted economical significance is well pointed out by the fact that there are more than 700 000 people in Europe who work for purely armaments industrial companies,

34 The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, Approved by the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) on 27 April 2006 and agreed by the EU Member States participating in the European Defence Agency.
35 COM(2006) 779, Commission interpretative communication of 7 December 2006 on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement.
36 COM(2007) 764, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 5 December 2007 – A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry.
while there are more than one and a half million people working for suppliers. Next to these numbers, it is worth to think about the income of the industry, which immediately shows why are some states so attached to maintaining national control and try to slow the unification. 37

Probably by recognizing this too the Union’s leaders decided that after their last successful expressly security and defense politics themed conference in 2008 38 they sit down to the conference table for the sake of the JSDP’s improvement on 19-20 December 2013. According to expert analyses this discussion did not bring a breakthrough again. As Tamas Csiki writes: „In the light of all this we can tell, that the significance of the 19-20 December summit meeting was mainly procedural and communicational, because it draw the European decision makers’ and somewhat the public opinion’s attention to joint security and defense policy again. In the particular problematic areas partial successes were born, which could help the continuation of already started processes and the fulfilment of programs, but it wasn’t a breakthrough – and it can’t be expected, until the necessary political will does not appear from the member-state’s part.” 39

4. SUMMARY AND PROPOSITION

The future of the political integration and with it the European Union depends mainly on the unification of the defense sector, and then on the Union’s joint defense capabilities created by the support of common defense industry. The harmonization of this field in fact belongs to the classical question of suverenity, since in one respect the states should have to – at least partially – give up the national control over the defense market, and after that they should support such a unified European defense investment policy, that could carry out an integrated market- and capability development. For this firstly it is necessary to create the appropriate regulation environment, secondly the budget frame for the development should be at their disposal, thirdly it is necessary to further develop the institutional structure to effectively supply the new aims. With all these, a harmonized capability upgrade could start in relation with the Union.

However next to the permanent and resounding successes the biggest question would still be open, namely that the member-states are willing to hand the key questions of defense to Union level, or instead of this they would create an effective

38 Although in 2012 a meeting was held to strengthen the previous decisions, but the experts stated about this that it didn't mean any meaningful advance. See Csiki, Tamás: Az Európai Tanács közös biztonság- és védelempolitikai csúcsalakozójának háttere és eredményének értékelése [The background and the rating of the defense- and security political summit of European Council], available at: http://nit.uni-nke.hu/downloads/Elemzesek/2014/SVKK_Elemzesek_2014_1.pdf [cit. 2014-04-16].
39 Ibid.
offer based system and with this reject the idea of „Europe-state” once and for all.

In my opinion we have to realize, that there are unconcealable differences between the European military forces since the enlargement of 2004, which makes the operation of the literal European army impossible, and this can not be helped by the expectations towards the member-states, since the army development is rather costly activity, and in the current economical situation it is an uncompleteable task for the member-states in point. This problem could be solved on one part by the strenghtening of th European Defense Agency and the real unification of the European defense market, in which the Agency would not only coordinate the connection between the companies and the customer member-states, but it would appear on the market as the Union’s sales executive, or it would operate as supervising institute of the a possibly establishable – partly member – state sponsored – European company group. By my conception the Union does not only need an unifying armaments industrial market, but it should accelerate the process by the joint action of its member-states with an Union armaments industrial company group. On the one hand I think the extension of the ATHENA sponsor program would by justified, or the creation of an independent European military capability improvement fund, which would sponsor the military improvement of member-states that assumes an obligaton – for example increased ready time battlegoup or EUFOR participation –, on the other hand to provide the funding of missing capabilities for member-states, for example by acquisition of new transport vehicles, but on Union level.

To sum it up I have to say, that a serious change in approach has to be made to strengthen the defense – and with it the political – integration and its succesful future. This could be an unfamiliar expectation in the current – newer – historical happy and peaceful days, but it can not be forgotten, that all the successes and results which realized in the integration, after all are viewed from the aspect of survival are standing on the foundation of defense capabilites, just as the state’s functioning, and at present these capabilities are on nation-state level and very many-sided, as viewed from Union level they are rather fragmented.

So firstly the defense sector and capabilities has to be treated on their place, secondly solutions has to be produced which keep the advantages that are typical to the integration and the support of the undeveloped, thirdly on the defense line priority has to be given to the market and research and developement integration. Moreover I think on middle-distance the member-state offering system and their suverenity has to be respected, but on the long run a position has to be taken in the the suverenity vs. „Europe-state” question.

To simplify, in the territory of defense decision has to be made: Europe want to do or only to pretend?

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